











who	 is	 responsible	 and	what	 for,	 but	 also	 the	 capability	 foundations	 upon	which	
responsibility	 is	 exercised,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 underlying	 normativity	 of	 this	 practice.	
Instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 capabilities	 as	 first	 principles	 from	 which	 responsibilities	
arise,	this	article	suggests	approaching	responsibility	as	a	web	of	relations.	On	the	
basis	 of	 this	 theoretical	discussion	 the	article	 turns	 to	 two	 cases	of	 contemporary	
Arctic	policy	where	we	can	observe	responsibility	‘at	work’.	The	fields	of	search	and	
rescue	 and	 sustainable	 development	 are	 both	marked	 by	 a	 cooperative	 approach	











What	 are	 the	 implications	 of	 institutionalising	 responsibility	 as	 a	 central	 element	 of	




highlights	 the	 ambiguous	 nature	 of	 responsibility	 as	 a	 normative	 element	 of	 global	
governance.	 It	makes	 its	 case	with	special	 reference	 to	 the	 fields	of	 search	and	rescue	
and	sustainable	development.	Insights	from	how	responsibility	is	institutionalised	in	the	
Arctic	 context	may	 also	 ultimately	 hold	 implications	 for	 how	we	 view	 global	 politics.	
Generally	speaking,	responsibility	has	developed	into	a	core	normative	concept	of	global	
politics	 that	 is	 continuously	 shaping	 relations	 between	 actors	 and	 the	 objects	 for	 or	
towards	which	they	are	assigned	or	take	responsibility.	This	constellation	of	relations	is	
sustained	on	 the	basis	of	existing,	assumed	or	claimed	capacities,	which	 in	 turn	raises	
fundamental	questions	about	the	normative	quality	of	these	links.	
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This	 article	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 recent	 theoretical	 debate	 among	 scholars	 of	
International	Relations,	which	has	highlighted	questions	about	who	 is	responsible	and	
what	 for.	 The	 article	 critiques	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 most	 encompassing	 treatment	 of	
responsibility	has	resulted	in	a	search	for,	or	reification	of,	‘first	principles’.	This	search	
takes	place	in	two	forms,	although	they	can	overlap.	First,	there	are	attempts	to	clearly	





this	 article	 draws	 on	 some	 of	 the	 related	 writings	 on	 responsibility	 in	 international	
political	 theory	 and	 legal	 philosophy	 to	 emphasise	 the	 usefulness	 of	 context-sensitive	
enquiries.	 It	 argues	 that	 capacities	 may	 matter,	 but	 they	 do	 so	 only	 within	 social	
contexts	and	practices.	Responsibility	cannot	be	determined	in	terms	of	first	principles,	
but	 rather	 through	 the	web	 of	 relations	 through	which	 it	 comes	 to	 life,	 including	 the	
normative	quality	of	the	connection	between	subject	and	object	of	responsibility.		
It	 is	 possible	 to	 observe	 an	 increase	 in	 references	 to	 responsibility	 across	diverse	
governance	 areas	 (Hansen-Magnusson	 and	 Vetterlein	 2018;	 Hansen-Magnusson,	
Vetterlein	 et	 al.	 2018),	 such	 as	 economics,	 security	 or	 the	 environment,	 in	 which	
responsibility	has	become	a	central	policy	norm:1	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR)	
shapes	 the	 way	 in	 which	 corporations	 interact	 with	 their	 surroundings,	 including	 a	
concern	for	the	environment	as	well	as	human	rights	(Dashwood	2014;	Karp	2014);	the	
responsibility	 to	 protect	 (R2P)	 has	 triggered	 a	much-discussed	 re-calibration	 of	 state	
sovereignty	 in	 favour	 of	 strengthened	 relations	 between	 the	 international	 community	
and	citizens	 (Wheeler	2006;	Bellamy	2011;	Hehir	2011;	Glanville	2014);	and	common	











concerns	 under	 the	 concept	 of	 sustainable	 development,	 which	 had	 been	 attempted	
since	the	1972	Stockholm	Conference	where	the	rights	of	the	individual	were	specified,	
such	as	 the	 rights	 to	adequate	 food,	housing,	 safe	water	 and	 family	planning.	On	page	
five	the	Report	shifted	the	responsibility	of	policy	efforts	to	the	global	collective:	
 
We live in an era in the history of nations when there is greater need than ever for co-ordinated political 
action and responsibility. The United Nations and its Secretary-General are faced with an enormous task 
and burden. Responsibly meeting humanity’s goals and aspirations will require the active support of us 
all. 
	
The	 Brundtland	 Report	 also	 provided	 a	 methodology	 to	 broaden	 and	 rethink	 the	
concept	 of	 security	 (Glanville	 2014),	 a	 conundrum	 which	 had	 been	 tackled	 by	 Willy	
Brandt	 and	 Olof	 Palme	 in	 different	 UN	 reports	 in	 the	 1980s,	 as	 well	 as	 by	 Boutros	


















becomes	 attributed	 to	 any	 actor	 in	 the	 first	 place	 (Lang	 Jr	 1999;	 Frost	 2004;	 Hoover	
2012).	The	article	argues	 that	we	can	 take	 lessons	 from	 these	debates,	with	a	view	 to	
addressing	 issues	 that	will	 elude	 those	who	search	 for	 first	principles.	On	 the	basis	of	
this	discussion,	the	article	offers	a	framework	that	discusses	the	subjects	and	objects	of	
responsibility,	the	different	forms	of	capacity	that	are	embedded	in	social	relations,	and	












improved	 access	 to	 resources	 such	 as	 oil	 and	 gas,	 but	 also	 raising	 questions	 about	
military	as	well	as	human	security	(Hoogensen	2007;	Hønneland	2016;	Hough	2017).	






of	 institutionalising	 responsibility	 that	 followed	 from	 the	 Brundtland	 Report,	 namely	
search	 and	 rescue	 and	 sustainable	 development.	 The	 focus	 on	 these	 rather	 well	
circumscribed	 areas	 of	 Arctic	 governance	 helps	 to	 illustrate	 the	 ambiguity	 that	
responsibility	may	contain	in	the	broader,	global	context.	
The	 remaining	 parts	 of	 the	 article	 are	 arranged	 as	 follows.	 The	 following	 section	
provides	a	synthesised	discussion	of	responsibility	in	global	politics.	The	section	draws	
together	different	strands	of	contemporary	debate	 to	highlight	 that	responsibility	 is	at	
the	 core	of	 contractual	 relations	 in	 global	politics,	which	yield	 ethical,	 legal	 as	well	 as	
political	 concerns.	 The	 section	 underscores	 the	 need	 to	 look	 into	 the	 capacities	 upon	





Based	 on	 this	 theoretical	 groundwork,	 the	 article	 then	 turns	 to	 discuss	
responsibility	in	the	context	of	the	Arctic.	It	 looks	at	the	way	in	which	responsibility	is	
anchored	 in	 search	 and	 rescue	 agreements	 as	 well	 as	 approaches	 to	 sustainable	
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Responsibility	 is	 a	 relational	 concept,	which	normatively	 links	 actors	 and	objects.	The	
Latin	verb	“spondere”,	from	which	the	noun	responsibility	ultimately	derives,	connotes	
both	“to	promise”	and	“to	pledge”,	as	well	as	“contract	to	give/take	 in	marriage”.2	This	
contractual	 understanding	 of	 a	 relation	 is	 echoed	 in	 civil	 law,	where	 responsibility	 is	
always	 to	 someone	and	 for	 something	 (Cane	2002,	 50).	Responsibility	 therefore	 gives	
rise	to	contractual	relations	of	which	we	can	ask,	first,	“who	is	responsible?”,	which	we	
will	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 subject	 of	 responsibility,	 and	 second,	 “what	 object	 are	 they	
responsible	for?”,	which	denotes	the	object	of	responsibility.		
A	 number	 of	 International	 Relations	 scholars,	 who	 have	 undertaken	 the	 most	
encompassing	contributions	 to	 this	 field,	have	been	attempting	 to	clarify	 the	nature	of	
this	contractual	relationship	by	highlighting	at	least	one	of	two	aspects	from	which	they	
seek	 to	conclude	some	kind	of	 first	principle.	Both	aspects	 can	be	defined	as	 capacity,	
consisting	of	either	material	resources	or	legal	arrangements	on	the	basis	of	which	the	
relations	between	subject	and	object	of	responsibility	take	shape.	I	discuss	these	types	
of	capacity	 in	 turn,	before	arguing	 that	responsibility	eludes	determinacy	because	 it	 is	
entangled	in	a	web	of	relations.		








special	 responsibilities	 as	 a	 hierarchical	 element	 of	 global	 politics,	 based	 on	material	
power	 (Bukovansky,	 Clark	 et	 al.	 2012,	 7).	 These	 authors	 argue	 that	 special	





represents	 a	 compromise	 between	 the	 formally	 equal	 responsibilities	 of	 states	 under	
international	 law	on	 the	one	hand,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 states	are	equally	answerable	 for	
legal	commitments	and	obligations,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	observation	that	states	
are	differentiated	in	terms	of	material	capacity	(ibid.,	8).	While	they	make	the	case	with	
regard	 to	 the	 United	 States,	 their	 work	 is	 characteristic	 of	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 English	
School-related	 approaches	 that	 share	 in	 common	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 role	 of	 capacity	 for	









This	 view	 is	 supported	 by	 work	 in	 the	 field	 of	 International	 Political	 Theory.	 For	
example,	 Toni	 Erskine	 has	 repeatedly	 made	 the	 case	 that	 states	 possess	 moral	
responsibility	to	remedy	crises	when	conventional	mechanisms	for	decision	making	fail.	
She	 draws	 on	 debates	 on	 individual	 versus	 collective	 responsibility	 in	 philosophy	
(French	1972)	to	make	the	case	for	so-termed	coalitions	of	the	willing	to	form	in	times	





in	 this	 field	 engages	 with	 formalised	 relations	 between	 actors,	 usually	 states,	 to	
determine	accountability	 as	 the	 core	 feature	 of	 responsibility	 relations.	 In	 the	 field	 of	
regulatory	 governance,	 for	 instance,	 scholars	 are	 interested	 in	 defining	 who	 is	
responsible	 across	 a	 number	 of	 different	 levels,	 from	 policy-making	 all	 the	 way	 to	
implementation	 (Bianculli,	 Fernàndez-i-Marín	 et	 al.	 2015).	 Others	 seek	 to	 remedy	
accountability	gaps	in	global	politics	by	forming	new	institutions	or	widening	the	remit	
of	existing	ones.	In	this	vein,	it	has	been	suggested	that	the	International	Criminal	Court	
may	 try	 not	 just	 violent	 but	 also	 nonviolent	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 (Aloyo	 2013).	
Overall,	 the	accountability	deficit	 in	global	politics	has	been	discussed	repeatedly	over	
the	past	decade	(Slaughter	2004;	Grant	and	Keohane	2005;	Bovens	2007;	McCorquodale	
2013;	 Zürn	 2018).	 In	 its	 search	 for	 a	 first	 principle	 regarding	 who	 is	 actually	
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responsible,	 this	 literature	addresses	both	positive	and	negative	responsibilities	–	 that	
is,	engaging	in	actions	that	would	prevent	or	stop	causing	harm	(Karp	2014;	Wettstein	
2015)	–	but	the	majority	of	research	deals	with	remedial	responsibility	(Miller	2001)	for	









of	 capacity,	 scholarship	 should	engage	with	 the	multiple	 relations	of	which	 they	are	a	
part	and	the	social	configurations	(Jackson	2006)	to	which	they	give	rise.	
I	 contend	 that	 responsibility	 is	 part	 of	 a	 web	 of	 relations	 that	 enables	 particular	
forms	 of	 politics	 through	 processes	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 as	 well	 as	 by	 creating	








Legal	philosophers	have	emphasised	 the	 complexity	of	 the	 subject-question	 through	a	
discussion	of	what	can	be	termed	causal	or	outcome	responsibility	(Honoré	1999;	Miller	
2007).	Specifically,	 they	 link	responsibility	to	procedure	and	substance	by	highlighting	






drunken	captain	who	caused	his	boat	 to	 sink.3	Thus,	while	 substantive	capacity	or	 the	
material	 endowment	 through	 which	 an	 actor	 can	 take	 responsibility	 for	 something	
surely	matters,	Miller	and	Honoré	remind	us	that	roles	such	as	that	of	captain	are	also	
linked	to	ideational	capacity.	This	second	notion	of	capacity	may	refer	to	a	legal	position	
that	 is	 embedded	 in	 a	web	 of	 normative	 expectations.	 Being	 a	 captain	 requires	more	
than	knowledge	of	navigation	–	the	material	component	–	it	also	involves	a	duty	of	care	
for	 boat	 and	 passengers.	 Capacity	 may	 also	 be	 a	 mixture	 of	 the	 two	 –	 for	 instance,	
regarding	social	expectations	of	what	can	be	reasonably	expected	from	an	actor.	Thus,	
not	 only	 does	 an	 actor	 require	 the	 physical	 means	 to	 cause	 an	 event	 in	 order	 to	 be	
responsible	 for	 it	 –	 which	 resembles	 the	 debate	 about	 agency	 among	 sociologists	
(Campbell	2009);	judgement	about	the	way	in	which	the	event	came	about	is	also	linked	
to	societal	expectations	of	what	was	reasonable	conduct,	especially	 if	some	alternative	
event	 was	 not	 brought	 about.4	In	 this	 regard,	 the	 law	 often	 makes	 exceptions	 for	
children	 or	 deeds	 committed	 under	 great	 emotional	 strain.	 This	 latter	 example	 is	
arbitrary,	though,	as	made	plain	by	Honoré	when	he	writes	that	“being	responsible	and	
being	legally	liable	are	partly	a	matter	of	luck”	(Honoré	1999,	1).	
It	 has	 recently	 been	 argued	 that	 “responsibility	 is	 more	 than	 accountability”	
(Vetterlein	2018),	especially	because	not	all	regulations	prescribe	behaviour	in	minute	
detail.	 Rather,	 responsibility	 includes	 a	 moral	 dimension	 in	 which	 future	 conduct	
becomes	 the	subject	of	negotiation.	With	regard	 to	material	 capabilities,	 the	argument	
has	been	made	that	domestic	politics	matter	in	determining	how	the	capabilities	will	be	
put	 to	 use	 (Loke	 2016).	 It	 is	 therefore	 not	 a	 given	 that	 capacity	 alone	 adequately	
indicates	how	responsibility	will	be	enacted	(Hoover	2012).	In	short,	what	matters	are	
the	 social	 processes	 through	which	 responsibility	 comes	 to	 life,	which	 encompass	 the	
politics	 of	 excluding	 those	 who	 might	 not	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 join	 a	 coalition,	 even	
though	 they	 might	 be	 willing,	 and	 related	 questions	 of	 who	 is	 not	 included	 in	 the	
																																																								
3	In	what	is	probably	the	most	widely-cited	example	in	the	literature,	Hart	presents	a	neat	but	
oversimplified	account	of	responsibility	types:	“As captain of the ship, X was responsible for the safety of his 
passengers and crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every night and was responsible for the loss of the ship 
with all aboard. It was rumoured that he was insane, but the doctors considered that he was responsible for his 
actions. Throughout the voyage he behaved quite irresponsibly, and various incidents in his career showed that 
he was not a responsible person. He always maintained that the exceptional winter storms were responsible for 
the loss of the ship, but in the legal proceedings brought against him he was found criminally responsible for his 
negligent conduct, and in separate civil proceedings he was held legally responsible for the loss of life and 






Concerning	 the	 object	 of	 responsibility,	 contractual	 relations	 are	 also	 more	
complicated	 than	 International	 Relations	 scholars	 conventionally	 assume.	 While	
Bukovansky,	Clark	et	al.	(2012)	examine	special	responsibilities	with	regard	to	climate	
change,	 nuclear	 politics	 and	 finance,	 recent	 work	 on	 businesses’	 corporate	 social	
responsibility	 and	 human	 rights	 questions	 whether	 the	 subject	 and	 object	 of	
responsibility	are	not	linked	in	more	complex	ways.	For	instance,	the	debate	about	who	
has	remedial	responsibility	for	human	rights	pitches	cosmopolitan	accounts	which	hold	
that	 states	are	 in	charge	 (Pogge	2005)	against	pluralists	who	argue	 that	multinational	
corporations,	perhaps	NGOs	as	well,	possess	more	capability	to	deliver	on	human	rights	
than	 some	 states	with	weak	 governance	 infrastructure	 (O'Neill	 2005,	 46;	Karp	2014).	
Some	 scholars	have	argued	 that	 the	 formalisation	of	 corporate	 social	 responsibility	 in	
the	so-called	Ruggie	or	Guiding	Principles	(Ruggie	2011)	is	troubling	because	bestowing	
remedial	 responsibility	on	 corporations	 legitimises	 them	and	 their	 actions,	while	 they	
often	 seek	 to	 avoid	 public	 accountability	 (Thompson	 2012;	 Dashwood	 2014).	
Conventionally,	 multinational	 corporations	 have	 responsibility	 towards	 their	
shareholders	 and	 not	 the	 local	 communities	 in	 which	 they	 operate.	 Despite	 cautious	
optimism	 that	 corporations	may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 the	 profit-maximising	 beasts	 that	
they	are	sometime	portrayed	to	be,	who	is	to	say	which	object	they	prioritise?		
The	 situation	 surrounding	 multiple	 objects	 of	 responsibility	 is	 similar	 to	 that	
regarding	 states.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 development	 of	 the	 “responsibility	 to	 protect”	
puts	 the	 international	 community	 in	 charge	 of	 human	 rights	 if	 a	 state	 fails	 to	 uphold	
these	 (Welsh	 and	 Banda	 2010).	 Humanitarian	 law	 provides	 the	 normative	 context	 in	
which	a	possible	intervention	should	take	place,	emphasising	that	civilians	must	not	be	
targeted	 and	 that	 the	 means	 used	 are	 proportionate.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 states	 have	
responsibility	 towards	 their	 own	 citizens,	 including	 military	 personnel,	 which	 is	 the	
scenario	emphasised	by	(neo-)realists	(Waltz	1959).	Similar	to	the	issue	of	prioritising	





responsibility	 or	 “responsibilising”	 an	 issue	 is	 a	normative	process:	 relations	between	
subject	 and	 object	 of	 responsibility	 are	 normatively	 underpinned	 because	
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responsibilising	attempts	to	define	what	counts	as	capacity	in	the	first	place,	as	well	as	
how	 this	 capacity	not	only	 enables	 actors	 to	 take	on	 responsibility	 for	 something,	 but	
also	 how	 holding	 capacity	might	 give	 rise	 to	 a	moral	 imperative	 to	 act.	 Capacity	 thus	
refers	to	more	than	material	or	legal	aspects;	it	entails	a	social	component	as	well.	In	its	














is	 the	 main	 actor	 in	 charge.	 It	 executes	 its	 responsibility	 based	 on	 capacity,	 which	
comprises	 two	major	elements.	The	 first	 is	 generally	 referred	 to	as	 “maritime	domain	
awareness”(MDA),6	while	the	second	comprises	specific	legal	provisions.	Both	reinforce	
each	other	as	legal	agreements	legitimise	the	building	of	infrastructure	Responsibility	is	
thereby	 institutionalised	 by	 capacity	 enhancing	 steps,	 yet	 this	 capacity	 need	 not	
exclusively	 be	 put	 to	 ‘good’	 use.	 This	 is	 because	 search	 and	 rescue	 organisations	 are	
state	 institutions	 which	 are	 responsible	 for	 ensuring	 safety	 at	 sea,	 i.e.	 benefitting	
humanity,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 enforcing	 sovereignty	 on	 the	 other.	 The	 section	
concludes	 by	 discussing	 this	 constellation	 of	 multiple	 objects	 of	 responsibility	 as	 a	
potential	dilemma.		
From	 this	 discussion	 I	 move	 on	 to	 look	 at	 sustainable	 development,	 which	 is	
enabled	 by	 the	 legacy	 of	 the	 Brundtland	 Report.	 While	 there	 are	 indicators	 which	









may	 be	 approached	 from	different	 angles,	 the	 question	 concerns	what	 happens	when	
responsible	 actors	 shift	 their	 focus.	 Following	 from	 the	 conceptual	 discussion	 in	 the	





differ	 in	 the	 organisational	 structure	 of	 their	 SAR	 organisations.	 The	 SAR	 Agreement	
identifies	 different	 so-termed	 “competent	 authorities”	 who	 administer	 the	 respective	
SAR	agency	or	agencies	in	each	country	(SAR	Agreement	2011,	Appendix	1),	such	as	the	
Minister	of	National	Defence	 (Canada),	 the	Danish	Maritime	Authority	 (Denmark),	 the	
Ministry	of	the	Interior	and	the	Finnish	Transport	Safety	Agency	(Finland),	the	Ministry	
of	the	Interior	(Iceland),	the	Ministry	of	Justice	and	the	Police	(Norway),	the	Ministry	of	
Transport	of	 the	Russian	Federation,	as	well	as	 the	Ministry	of	 the	Russian	Federation	
for	Civil	Defence,	Emergency,	and	the	Elimination	of	Consequences	of	Natural	Disasters	
(Russia),	 the	 Swedish	Maritime	 Administration	 (Sweden)	 and	 the	 United	 States	 Coast	
Guard	(USA).	It	is	usually	the	coast	or	border	guard	that	takes	the	lead	in	executing	SAR	
operations	(SAR	Agreement	2011,	Appendix	 II),	but	 there	are	considerable	differences	
between	 the	 countries	 regarding	 the	 role	 of	 this	 organisation	 (Østhagen	 2016).	 For	
example,	 the	 United	 States	 Coast	 Guard	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 five	 branches	 of	 the	
country’s	 armed	 forces,	 not	 dissimilar	 to	 the	 role	 of	 Finnish	 or	 even	 Icelandic	 coast	
guards.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 Swedish	Maritime	 Administration	 primarily	 exists	 to	 provide	
services	 to	 (commercial)	 shipping,	 while	 the	 Swedish	 Navy	 takes	 on	 the	 role	 of	
controlling	 and	 securing	 Swedish	 borders	 (Sjöfartsverket	 n.d.).	 Yet	 despite	 this	
organisational	variation,	it	is	clear	that	SAR	competencies	rest	with	respective	states	and	
responsibility	has	not	been	fragmented	and	shared	with	non-state	parties.	




for	 other	 countries	 and	 explains	 the	 dual	 nature	 of	 what	 states	 are	 responsible	 for.	
Aspects	 of	 security,	which	 relate	 to	 considerations	 of	 state	 sovereignty,	were	 present	
from	 the	 very	 beginning.	 In	 1809	 the	 so-called	 “Preventive	Waterguard”	was	 formed,	
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which	 would	 later	 become	 HM	 Coast	 Guard.	 Its	 primary	 purpose	 was	 to	 ensure	
sovereignty	and	security,	particularly	by	fighting	smuggling	during	the	Napoleonic	War.	





the	Coast	Guard,	 this	parallel	build-up	of	 capacity	 is	 evidence	of	 a	more	humanitarian	
focused	understanding	of	responsibility.	For	instance,	Lloyds	established	rescue	stations	
around	the	coast	from	1802	onwards.	Building	on	this	infrastructure,	a	private	initiative	
of	philanthropists	gathered	by	Sir	William	Hillary	 founded	 the	National	 Institution	 for	
the	 Preservation	 of	 Life	 from	 Shipwreck	 in	 1824.8	It	 changed	 its	 name	 to	 the	 Royal	




affairs	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	Merchant	 Shipping	 Act,	 essentially	merging	 RNLI	 and	
Coast	Guard	services	under	one	roof.	Even	after	the	Board’s	subsidy	ended	in	1869	and	
the	 RNLI	 became	 independent	 and	 reliant	 on	 its	 own	 resources	 once	 more,	 the	
institutional	cooperation	continued.10		
Overall,	 these	 institutional	developments	 in	 the	UK	provided	 the	blueprint	 for	 the	
way	 in	which	SAR	came	 to	be	organised	 in	other	 countries.	The	dual	 responsibility	of	





























based,	 such	 as	 vessels	 (Wood-Donnelly	 2013)	 –	 in	 other	 words,	 SAR	 is	 capacity-
intensive.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Arctic,	 responsibility	 is	 institutionalised	 through	 a	
framework	 of	 treaties	 and	 conventions	 which	 have	 been	 devised	 over	 the	 course	 of	
several	 decades.	 They	 are	 part	 of	 a	 global	 attempt	 to	 create	 a	 unified	 governance	


































1912.	 The	 convention	 was	 updated	 repeatedly	 during	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 and	 its	






Chicago	Convention	 (Convention	on	 International	Civil	Aviation),	which	was	agreed	 in	
1944.	 It	 established	 the	 International	 Civil	 Aviation	 Organization	 (ICAO)	 which	 is	 an	
agency	of	the	UN.	Although	obviously	concerned	with	aviation	issues,	the	convention	has	
an	impact	on	the	rules	of	SAR	at	sea	as	well.	The	ICAO’s	agreement	makes	responsibility	













to	 a	 local	 agency	 can	be	 interpreted	 as	 a	move	 to	 emphasise	 the	 intention	 to	 provide	
assistance	over	concerns	of	sovereignty.	This	cooperative	spirit	was	carried	over	almost	





Despite	 being	 parties	 to	 the	 1944	 Chicago	 Convention	 and	 the	 1979	 SAR	
Convention,	 the	 Arctic	 states	 also	 devised	 their	 own	 “Agreement	 on	 Cooperation	 in	
Aeronautical	and	Maritime	Search	and	Rescue	in	the	Arctic”,	which	was	signed	in	2011.	













this	 is	 the	 first	 legally	 binding	 agreement	 that	 was	 negotiated	 under	 its	 guidance.14	
Commentators	regard	the	agreement	as	a	 trust-building	tool	as	 it	encourages	but	does	
not	require	the	sharing	of:	information	services	and	procedures,	techniques,	equipment	
and	 facilities;	 joint	 research	 and	 development	 initiatives;	 and	 joint	 search-and-rescue	
exercises	 (Exner-Pirot	 2012;	 Byers	 2013;	 Wood-Donnelly	 2013).	 The	 agreement	
supports	 collaboration	 in	 mutual	 exercises	 and	 operations,	 including	 exchange	 visits	
between	 personnel	 (SAR	 Agreement	 2011,	 Article	 9.3),	 which	 has	 been	 successfully	
realised	with	 the	help	of	 the	Arctic	Coast	Guard	Forum	(Eckstein	2016).	 In	particular,	
observers	praise	the	pragmatic	approach	towards	saving	lives	and	emergency	response	
that	 prevails	 among	 colleagues	 from	 different	 countries,	 even	 during	 times	 of	
geopolitical	 tensions	 (Sevunts	 2018).	 In	 recent	 years	 the	 Coast	 Guard	 Forum	 has	























































15 Compare National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (2011).  
16 Compare article by The Maritime Executive (2016).  
17 Compare Arctic Council (2016).  
18 Compare Gordinier (2016). 
19  Compare Arctic Coast Guard Forum (2017) . 










the	 significance	 of	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 responsibility	 in	 SAR	policies	 through	 an	
interpretation	 of	 the	web	 of	 practices	 (compare	 Figure	 2).	 Trust	 between	 states	 is	 an	






international	 society	 together.	 The	 SAR	 agreement	 is	 normatively	 embedded	 in	 a	












we	 need	 to	 caution	 against	 a	 teleological	 interpretation	 of	 this	 trajectory.	 Other	 than	
stating	 that	 this	 is	 a	 potentially	 positive	 development,	 there	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	
responsibility	 for	 humanity	 will	 continue	 to	 trump	 the	 assertion	 of	 sovereignty.	 The	
reason	 for	 this	 potential	 shift	 is	 that	 the	 development	 of	 SAR	 only	 works	 based	 on	
increased	 MDA	 capacity	 that	 is	 spread	 across	 civilian	 and	 military	 agencies.21	Their	
																																																																																																																																																																													
	
21	The	different	agencies	responsible	for	SAR	include the Canadian Forces and Canadian Coast Guard, the 
Danish Maritime Authority, the Danish Transport Authority, the Ministry of Fisheries – Faroe Islands, the 
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exact	tasks	are	subject	to	state	regulation,	which	means	that	they	can	change	over	time.	
While	 the	SAR	agreement	provides	a	 legal	capacity	 to	 legitimately	build	 infrastructure	
and	encourages	cross-border	cooperation,	the	potential	for	dual	use	(Forge	2010)	of	this	
infrastructure	 means	 that	 its	 originally	 intended	 use	 may	 not	 be	 the	 only	 one.	 The	










means	 that	 sensitive	 information	may	not	be	 shared	 freely	 among	all	members	of	 the	
Forum.	After	all,	as	the	US	Coast	Guard’s	Adm.	Zukunft	holds,	“(T)he	forum	is	not	likely	
to	 take	 up	 more	 contentious	 issues,	 such	 as	 freedom	 of	 navigation	 and	 issues	 of	
sovereignty	 (…because	 it	 primarily	 exists)	 for	 navigational	 safety”	 (CBC	 News	 2015).	





i.e.	 if,	when,	and	to	what	extent	 it	will	be	free	of	 ice	for	at	 least	some	parts	of	the	year	
(Keskitalo	 2004;	 Byers	 2009;	 Humrich	 and	 Wolf	 2011;	 Koivurova	 2011;	 Keil	 2014).	
Countries	may	be	increasingly	likely	to	evoke	the	law	of	the	sea	concerning	freedom	of	
navigation	 (Kraska	 and	 Fahey	 2017),	 just	 as	 the	 Arctic	 5	 states	 agreed	 to	 uphold	
international	 law	 in	 their	 joint	 Ilulissat	Declarations	 in	 2008	 (Dodds	 2008).	However,	
this	 principle	 of	 maritime	 governance,	 according	 to	 which	 ships	 may	 pass	 through	




Finnish Border Guard, the Icelandic Coast Guard, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Northern Norway 
(JRCC NN Bodø), the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency and Russian Federal Agency for Marine and River 
Transport, the Swedish Maritime Administration, and the United States Coast Guard and Department of Defense 




status	 of	 the	 Northwest	 Passage,	 i.e.	 whether	 it	 is	 an	 international	 straight	 (the	 US	
position)	 or	 whether	 it	 constitutes	 international	 waters	 (the	 Canadian	 position).	
Building	 capacity	 for	 MDA	 in	 the	 name	 of	 responsibility	 could	 eventually	 be	 used	 to	
restrict	 access	 to	 the	 Northern	 Sea	 Route	 by	 Russia	 (Kraska	 and	 Fahey	 2017;	 Royal	





does	 not	 guarantee	 agreement	 among	 participants	 on	 what	 constitutes	 the	 nomos	
(Lebow	2003).	In	particular,	projecting	power	and	appearing	as	a	powerful	actor	is	one	
of	the	key	aspects	of	Russian	Arctic	politics	(Piskunova	2010;	Laruelle	2014).	However,	
as	militarisation	and	security	are	 topics	 that	are	explicitly	omitted	 from	the	agenda	of	
the	 Arctic	 Council,	 the	 question	 of	 how	militarisation	 could	 be	 guided	 to	 ensure	 that	
capacity	is	channelled	towards	the	appropriate	cause	remains	unaddressed.	The	Arctic	
Council	brings	 together	at	 least	 two	actors,	 the	USA	and	Russia,	who	have	a	history	of	
non-cooperation.	While	the	agreement	on	SAR	is	remarkable,	their	presence	and	future	
convergence	 on	 normative	 principles	 guiding	 responsibility	 at	 sea	 stands	 out	 as	
something	 that	 requires	 further	 discussion	 and	 investigation.	 As	 long	 as	 there	 is	 no	
agreement	that	freedom	of	navigation	under	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Law	
of	the	Sea	is	a	fundamental	right	and	a	ius	cogens	norm,	capacity-building	for	the	sake	of	





Arctic	 in	 general,	 further	 cooperation	 based	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 sustainable	 development	
underpins	 the	 qualitative	 aspects	 of	 these	 activities.	 Members	 of	 the	 Arctic	 Council	
generally	agree	 that	human	activity	 in	 the	Arctic	must	 follow	principles	of	 sustainable	
development,	 thereby	 taking	 responsibility	 for	 their	 conduct	 and	 for	 their	 relations	





states	 need	 to	 meet	 diverging	 responsibilities	 simultaneously.	 To	 demonstrate	 the	
advantage	 of	 the	 approach	 taken	 in	 this	 article,	 I	 first	 show	 the	 origins	 of	 sustainable	
development	in	the	Arctic	and	highlight	institutionalisation	as	a	legacy	of	the	Brundtland	
Report,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 empowerment	 of	 local	 actors.	 Yet,	 as	 the	 second	 step	 shows,	
developing	 capacity	 is	 not	 an	 unambiguously	 positive	 issue.	 Web	 of	 responsibility	
relationships	shed	 light	not	only	on	competing	claims	to	competence	–	between	states	
and	non-state	actors	–	but	also	on	the	diverse	relations	of	responsibility	that	each	actors	
might	be	entangled	 in	 (compare	Figure	3).	 For	 the	purpose	of	 showing	 the	 conflicting	
relations	of	 responsibility	 in	 the	context	of	 sustainable	Arctic	development,	 the	article	







than	 search	 and	 rescue.	We	 are	dealing	with	more	 actors	whose	 legitimacy	 to	 engage	
with	sustainability	is	derived	from	a	number	of	capacity-enhancing	sources.	At	the	same	
time	 the	 object	 of	 responsibility	 cannot	 be	 clearly	 delineated	 either,	 pointing	 towards	
potential	conflicts	of	interests	or	priorities.	
The	Arctic	8	are	the	primary	subjects	of	responsibility	for	sustainable	development,	
but	 the	 distinctive	 arrangement	 of	 the	 Arctic	 Council	 means	 that	 they	 are	 joined	 by	
representatives	 of	 indigenous	 populations	 from	 the	 region,	 the	 so-termed	 Permanent	
Participants.	 Even	 though	 the	 Permanent	 Participants	 have	 the	 right	 to	 active	
participation	and	consultation	but	no	right	 to	vote,	 they	can	effectively	veto	 initiatives	
by	states	since	the	mode	of	decision-making	in	the	Council	is	by	consensus	(Nord	2016,	
38	and	70).	This	multi-stakeholder	governance	arrangement	of	power	sharing	places	the	
Permanent	 Participants	 at	 quasi	 eye-level	with	 states,	 and	makes	 the	Arctic	 Council	 a	
unique	governance	experiment	in	contemporary	global	politics.	Permanent	Participants	
occupy	a	much	stronger	position	 in	 the	Arctic	Council	 than	 the	other	official	state	and	





grew,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 wider	 normative	 context	 that	 empowers	 non-state	 actors	 in	
international	 politics.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 Brundtland	 Report	 provided	 some	 of	 the	
impetus	 for	 a	 global	 turn	 towards	 reconsidering	 environmental	 issues.	 In	 this	 context	
Finnish	and	Canadian	initiatives,	as	well	as	changes	in	the	geopolitical	setting	at	the	end	
of	 the	1980s	 and	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	were	 conducive	 to	 enhancing	Arctic	 cooperation	
(Keskitalo	 2004;	 Langhelle,	 Blindheim	 et	 al.	 2008).	 As	 a	 precursor	 to	 the	 Council,	
emphasising	what	would	 later	 become	 the	 Council’s	 environmental	 pillar,	 the	 Finnish	
government	 developed	 the	 Arctic	 Environmental	 Protection	 Strategy	 (Arctic	
Environmental	Protection	Strategy	1991	short:	AEPS)	which	was	“highly	influenced	by	
the	 Brundtland	 Report”	 (Langhelle,	 Blindheim	 et	 al.	 2008).	 The	 AEPS	 stated	 in	 its	
objectives	 that	 sustainable	 economic	 development	 should	 not	 have	 unacceptable	







Subsequently,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 organisational	 differentiation	 that	 had	 begun	 under	
AEPS,	 once	 the	 Arctic	 Council	 was	 officially	 founded	 following	 persistent	 Canadian	
initiatives	(Nord	2016),	cooperation	focused	on	themes	ranging	from	the	monitoring	of	
pollutants,	 the	 conservation	 of	 flora	 and	 fauna,	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 maritime	
environment,	 and	 cooperation	mechanisms	 to	 respond	 to	 environmental	 emergencies.	
In	1998	the	Sustainable	Development	Working	Group	(SDWG)	was	established.	Again,	it	
took	its	mandate	from	the	understanding	of	responsibility	developed	in	the	Brundtland	
Report.	 The	 Sustainable	 Development	 Action	 Plan	 became	 the	 SDWG’s	 strategic	
framework.	 It	 included	 economic,	 social	 and	 environmental	 dimensions	of	 sustainable	
development,	 such	 as	 the	 sustainable	 use	 of	 resources,	 sustainable	 economic	 activity	
and	 increasing	 the	prosperity	 of	Arctic	 communities,	 gender	 equality,	 enhancing	well-
being	 and	 the	 eradication	 of	 poverty	 among	 Arctic	 people,	 biodiversity	 conservation,	
and	 climate	 change	 impact	 assessment,	 among	 others	 (Arctic	 Council	 2004).	 Most	
importantly,	 the	 SDWG	 introduced	 a	 particular	 “human	 dimension”	 (Nord	 2016)	 to	
responsibility,	 prioritising	 health,	 education,	 employment	 or	 changes	 in	 lifestyle	 as	
opposed	to	business	opportunities	or	environmental	protection.	
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On	 the	other	hand,	 the	Brundtland	Report	also	empowered	 the	 role	of	 indigenous	













the	 prospect	 of	 benefiting	 from	 jobs	 created,	 that	 the	 former	 president	 of	 the	 Inuit	
Circumpolar	 Council	 (ICC)	 reminded	 states	with	 an	 interest	 in	 investing	 in	 the	 Arctic	







Representatives	of	 the	 indigenous	populations	have	 repeatedly	asserted	 their	position	
that	 they	 participate	 in	 the	 forum	 as	 an	 entity	with	 sovereign	 rights,	which	 draws	 its	
legitimacy	from	having	lived	in	the	area	prior	to	the	establishment	of	states	and	from	the	
United	Nations	Declaration	of	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples	(Nord	2016).	Their	claim	
is	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 Council	 as	 rights	 holders	 and	 not	 just	 merely	 stakeholders	




The	 coexistence	of	 state	 and	non-state	 actors	 in	 the	Arctic	Council	 is	 unique	 in	 global	
politics,	and	 is	working	surprisingly	well.	However,	 it	also	complicates	 the	question	of	
who	 takes	 responsibility	 and	 what	 for,	 because	 the	 Permanent	 Participants	 share	









conceived	understandings	 of	 economic	 development.	 The	 set-up	 of	 the	Arctic	 Council,	
with	at	least	two	groups	that	lay	claim	to	sovereignty	over	the	same	space,	and	themes	
that	 may	 yield	 conflicting	 policies,	 such	 as	 environmental	 protection	 and	 sustainable	
development,	seems	conducive	to	heightening	tensions	between	actors	and	over	issues.	
In	particular,	 states	who	bear	 formal	powers	 for	policy	 implementation	may	 find	 that	
they	 are	 torn	 between	 competing	 responsibilities	 that	 they	 have	 to	 reconcile	
simultaneously.	
This	 dilemma	 is	 illustrated	 by	 a	 growing	 body	 of	 research	 that	 addresses	
sustainable	 development	 in	 the	 Arctic.	 The	 lead	 authors	 of	 the	 first	 Arctic	 Human	
Development	Report	(AHDR-I)	argued	that	“large	quantities	of	profits	and	rents,	arising	
mostly	from	the	extraction	of	natural	resources	on	a	large	scale,	 flow	out	of	the	Arctic,	
depriving	 authorities	 in	 the	 region	 or	 potential	 sources	 of	 revenue”	 (Einarsson	 and	
Young	2004).	This	situation	improved	to	some	extent	over	the	course	of	the	next	decade.	
The	 second	 Arctic	 Human	 Development	 Report	 (AHDR-II)	 highlights	 a	 number	 of	








and	 skilled	 people	 and	 the	 continuity	 of	 poverty	 issues,	 among	 others.	 There	 is	 a	
growing	discussion	about	 the	necessity	of	sustainable	development	as	an	empowering	
tool	 for	people	 in	 the	area,	 though	often	with	perhaps	an	unduly	narrow	emphasis	on	
preserving	 local	 and	 indigenous	 ways	 of	 life	 (Magga,	 Mathiesen	 et	 al.	 2014).	
Nevertheless,	 while	 there	 is	 widespread	 consensus	 among	 all	 members	 of	 the	 Arctic	
















in	 contravention	 of	 the	 2015	 Paris	 Agreement	 and	 has	 violated	 the	 Norwegian	
constitutional	 right	 to	 a	 healthy	 and	 safe	 environment	 for	 current	 and	 future	




knowledge	 and	 development	 (Bertelsen	 and	 Justinussen	 2016;	 Nord	 2016),	 such	 as	
high-speed	internet	connections	(Windeyer	2016)	as	well	as	rail	lines	that	link	the	Arctic	
Ocean	 to	 the	 Baltic	 Sea	 (Staalesen	 2017).	 However,	 it	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 who	 will	
benefit	from	these	developments	in	the	long-run,	i.e.	whether	the	investments	will	help	
to	mitigate	the	problems	addressed	in	the	AHDRs,	which	would	strengthen	a	normative	
commitment	 to	 humanitarian	 policies,	 or	 whether	 these	 are	 merely	 convenient	
arguments	 to	 reduce	 local	 scepticism	 towards	 large-scale	 development	 projects	
(Flyvbjerg	2001).		
Both	 examples	 highlight	 that	 responsibility	 is	 embedded	 in	 a	 web	 of	 normative	
relations,	 yet	 the	 competing	 responsibility	 links	 may	 be	 mutually	 exclusive.	 The	
entanglement	thereby	raises	questions	about	democratic	and	legal	accountability	which	
one	 could	 pursue	 in	 further	 research:	who	 gets	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 decision	making	
process?	What	kind	of	contractual	relations	exist	between	government	and	citizens,	on	
the	one	hand,	 and	between	governments	 and	 investing	 companies	on	 the	other?	Both	
states	 and	 representatives	 of	 indigenous	 populations	 have	 been	 empowered	 by	 an	
evolving	 framework	 of	 Arctic	 and	 extra-Arctic	 agreements	 and	 conventions	 to	 take	
responsibility	 for	 the	particular	object	 that	 is	 sustainable	development.	However,	as	 it	
turns	out,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	whose	development	it	is	that	needs	to	be	taken	care	of	
In	 the	 case	of	 industrial	 activity,	 for	 example,	 questions	may	be	 raised	 about	whether	
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there	 is	 a	 particular	 responsibility	 towards	 the	 local	 population	 who	 would	 be	
immediately	affected	by	air-borne	pollutants,	 let	alone	oil	spills,	or	whether	a	case	can	
be	made	 that	 the	 extracted	 revenues	would	 bring	 benefits	 to	 the	 country	 as	 a	whole.	






Responsibility	 has	 evolved	 as	 a	 global	 policy	 norm	 in	 different	 governance	 strands	
whose	 common	 denominator	 is	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 Brundtland	 Report.	 The	 report	
managed	 to	 bridge	 seemingly	 incompatible	 concepts,	 such	 as	 environmental	
responsibility	 and	 economic	 development,	 while	 also	 enabling	 a	 reinterpretation	 of	
sovereignty	as	responsibility.	 In	the	 latter	case	this	 is	supposed	to	be	protected	by	the	
international	community	in	case	a	state	fails	in	this	undertaking	vis-à-vis	its	citizens.	In	









multilateral	 agreements	 among	 Arctic	 states	 (and	 globally).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	
strengthens	a	state’s	role	by	taking	control	over	maritime	territory.	States	thus	prepare	
for	 increased	 economic	 activity	 following	 a	 thawing	 of	 Arctic	 ice	 and	 the	 opening	 of	
potentially	 accessible	 waterways	 for	 some	 part	 of	 the	 year.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	





similarly	 institutionalised	 trajectory.	 This	 has	 been	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 Arctic	 Council’s	
concerns	 since	before	 the	Council’s	 founding,	 drawing	 significant	 inspiration	 from	 the	
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Brundtland	 Report.	 After	 twenty	 years	 there	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 some	 success	 in	





projects	 will	 be,	 but	 as	 the	 examples	 of	 the	 lawsuit	 against	 the	 Norwegian	 state	 and	
potential	 problems	 of	 infrastructure	 development	make	 plain,	 it	 is	 not	 too	 difficult	 to	
imagine	scenarios	that	are	not	fully	beneficial	to	human	development	concerns.	
With	 a	 view	 to	 the	 broader	 debate	 about	 responsibility	 as	 a	 normative	 pillar	 in	
global	 politics,	 both	 cases	 underscore	 the	 value	 that	 can	 be	 derived	 from	 a	 holistic	
approach	 to	 responsibility.	 The	 article	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 move	 beyond	 a	
search	 for	 first	 principles	 that	 focuses	 on	 material	 capacity	 or	 legal	 provisions	 to	
determine	 accountability.	 Responsibilising	 an	 issue	 establishes	 contractual	 relations	
between	 subjects	 and	 objects	 of	 responsibility.	 It	 involves	 normative	 expectations	
regarding	 the	 existence,	 use	 and	 possible	 moral	 obligations	 of	 different	 forms	 of	
capacity,	while	also	establishing	or	reinforcing	hierarchies	between	actors	participating	
in	 the	 process.	 Finally,	 assigning	 responsibility	may	 also	 highlight	 an	 actor’s	 potential	

















































































































































































































































































































who who	not what what	not	/	what	else 
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Who:	coast	guard	/	state what humanity 
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Material:	MDA Legal:	Arctic	SAR	agreement normative	context:	global	SAR 
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Figure	2	-	The	Web	of	Responsibility	and	SAR	
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development 
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Arctic	Council normative	context:	sustainability 
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Who:	Permanent	Participants 
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United	Nations:	Ind.	People	Rights 
Figure	3	–	The	Web	of	Responsibility	and	Sustainable	Development	
